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Early studies pointed out that, the separation of corporate ownership and 
management will lead to a conflict of interest between owners and managers, 
resulting in agency costs. With the further development of agency theory, stewardship 
theory which studies the relationship between owners and managers from another 
angle gradually rises. The Pan-family firm is a widespread economic organization in 
China, it attracted attentions of many scholars due to the special nature of the multiple 
identities of its owners、managers. On the basis of principal-agent theory and 
stewardship theory, this paper tries to explore the impact of management control、
property control on Pan-family company’s performance. 
This paper selects Pan-family firms listed on SME Board and GEM between year 
2004-2010 as the sample，introducing variables on behalf of management control– 
Pan-family CEO、Ratio of Pan-family members in executive team、Unity of chairman 
and CEO and variables measuring property control–Pan-family members’ stake、
Dispersion of Pan-family members’ stake、The actual controller’s stake . We found 
that the effect of management control on firms’ performance: CEO as the Pan-family 
members have a significant negative impact on companies’ performance; The 
proportion of Pan-family members of the executive team have a significant negative 
impact on corporate performance; The unity of chairman and CEO has a significant 
positive correlation with corporate performance. The impact of property control on 
firm performance: The Pan-family members’ stake was significantly associated with 
company performance, the relationship is non-linear; The higher stake of actual 
controller of the company, the higher value of the company; The internal shareholding 
dispersion of Pan-family members and firm performance have no significant 
correlation. The interactional impact of management and property control on firm 
performance: The smaller the management control of Pan-family members, the 
greater the property control, better performance; Firms’ CEO and chairman is a 
non-Pan family member, higher of actual controller’ stake, better performance.  
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第一章 导 论 
1.1 研究背景与意义 
近期一些学者认为家族控制企业是一种普遍存在的组织结构，家族企业对整
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